Ergo is an open access philosophy journal accepting submissions on all philosophical topics and from all philosophical traditions. This includes, among other things: history of philosophy, work in both the analytic and continental traditions, as well as formal and empirically informed philosophy. Ergo is strongly committed to diversity and especially welcomes submissions from members of groups currently underrepresented in philosophy.

Submission and publication are free, and authors retain copyright under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 license. Generous support from the undergraduate departments of philosophy at the University of Toronto's St. George and Mississauga campuses and the University of Toronto's graduate department of philosophy make this arrangement possible.

Papers are published as they are accepted; there is no regular publication schedule.

Current Issue(s)

The Facts about Truthmaking: An Argument for Truthmaker Necessitarianism

Jamin Asay

Truthmaker necessitarianism is the view that an object is a truthmaker for a truth-bearer only if it is impossible for the object to exist and the truth-bearer be false. While this thesis is widely regarded as truthmaking “orthodoxy”, it is rarely explicitly defended. In this paper I offer an argument in favor of necessitarianism that raises the question of what the truthmakers are for the truths about truthmaking. The supposed advantages of non-necessitarianism dissolve once we take these truths into account.

What Is Language?

Carlos Santana

Linguists (and philosophers of language) have long disagreed about the ontology of language, and thus about the proper subject matter of their disciplines. A close examination of the leading arguments in the debates shows that while positive arguments that language is x tend to be sound, negative arguments that language is not x generally fail. This implies that we should be pluralists about the metaphysical status of language and the subject matter of linguistics and the philosophy of language. A pluralist ontology of language, however, involves pitfalls for research on language, and to avoid this pitfalls researchers should temper the pluralist attitude with two strictures. First, pluralism about the ontology of language precludes agnosticism about the ontology of language. Second, pluralism should not lead to isolated research programs.

Vague Chance?

Seamus Bradley

If there are events that are both vague and chancy, then those chances might not satisfy the axioms of probability. I provide an example of such vague chances, and demonstrate that whether or not chance-probabilism is true depends on your view on the logic of vagueness.

Coming Soon

Reference Magnetism as a Solution to the Moral Twin Earth Problem

Billy Dunaway and Tristram McPherson

Origins of Life Research does not rest on a Mistake

Brian Knab

Characterizing Invariance

Jack Woods

Epistemic Exploitation

Nora Berenstain

Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation

Gregg D. Caruso

Folk Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception

Pendaran Roberts, Keith Allen, and Kelly Ann Schmidtke

Cabbage à la Descartes

Devin Sanchez Curry

A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy

Alex Madva

Demystifying Emergence

David Yates