Ergo is an open access philosophy journal accepting submissions on all philosophical topics and from all philosophical traditions. This includes, among other things: history of philosophy, work in both the analytic and continental traditions, as well as formal and empirically informed philosophy. Ergo is strongly committed to diversity and especially welcomes submissions from members of groups currently underrepresented in philosophy.

Submission and publication are free, and authors retain copyright under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 license. Generous support from the undergraduate departments of philosophy at the University of Toronto's St. George and Mississauga campuses and the University of Toronto's graduate department of philosophy make this arrangement possible.

Papers are published as they are accepted; there is no regular publication schedule.

Current Issues

The Transitivity and Asymmetry of Actual Causation

Sander Beckers and Joost Vennekens

The counterfactual tradition to defining actual causation has come a long way since Lewis started it off. However there are still important open problems that need to be solved. One of them is the (in)transitivity of causation. Endorsing transitivity was a major source of trouble for the approach taken by Lewis, which is why currently most approaches reject it. But transitivity has never lost its appeal, and there is a large literature devoted to understanding why this is so. Starting from a survey of this work, we will develop a formal analysis of transitivity and the problems it poses for causation. This analysis provides us with a sufficient condition for causation to be transitive, a sufficient condition for dependence to be necessary for causation, and several characterisations of the transitivity of dependence. Finally, we show how this analysis leads naturally to several conditions a definition of causation should satisfy, and use those to suggest a new definition of causation.

A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences

Benjamin Lennertz

In this paper I present an argument for a rational norm involving quantificational credences. To support this norm, I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem. In order to prove the result, I introduce the novel concept of a quantificational bet. I also undertake a discussion of Dutch Book Theorems in general and remark on the similarities and differences between the Dutch Book Theorem for quantificational credences and Dutch Book Theorems for norms on ordinary and conditional credences. Overall, the discussion of the norm on quantificational credences gives us a fuller picture of the normative landscape of credal states.

Replacing Race: Interactive Constructionism about Racialized Groups

Adam Hochman

In this paper I defend anti-realism about race and a new theory of racialization. I argue that there are no races, only racialized groups. Many social constructionists about race have adopted racial formation theory to explain how ‘races’ are formed. However, anti-realists about race cannot adopt racial formation theory, because it assumes the reality of race. I introduce interactive constructionism about racialized groups as a theory of racialization for anti-realists about race. Interactive constructionism moves the discussion away from the dichotomous (social vs. biological) metaphysics that has marred this debate, and posits that racialized groups are the joint products of a broad range of non-racial factors, which interact.

Naive Validity, Internalization, and Substructural Approaches to Paradox

Lucas Rosenblatt

In this paper I investigate whether certain substructural theories are able to dodge paradox while at the same time containing what might be viewed as a naive validity predicate. To this end I introduce the requirement of internalization, roughly, that an adequate theory of validity should prove that its own metarules are validity-preserving. The main point of the paper is that substructural theories fail this requirement in various ways.

Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought

Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way

What ought you believe? According to a traditional view, it depends on your evidence: you ought to believe (only) what your evidence supports. Recently, however, some have claimed that what you ought to believe depends not on your evidence but simply on what is true: you ought to believe (only) the truth. This disagreement parallels one in ethics, between so-called perspectivists and objectivists. Perspectivists in ethics hold that how you ought to act depends on your epistemic position, whereas objectivists hold that it depends on all the facts, regardless of your epistemic position with respect to them. The view that what you ought to believe depends on your evidence can be thought of as a version of perspectivism about the epistemic ought; the view that what you ought to believe depends only on what is true can be thought of as a version of objectivism about the epistemic ought.

Coming Soon

Names, Masks, and Double Vision

Michael Olivier Rieppel

Passing as Privileged

Daniel Silvermint

Biased Against Debiasing: On the Role of (Institutionally Sponsored) Self-Transformation in the Struggle Against Prejudice

Alex Madva

The Logic of the Chiasm in Merleau-Ponty's Early Philosophy

Robin Muller

Leibniz on Fundamental Ontology: Idealism and Pedagogical Exoteric Writing

John Whipple

Halfhearted Action and Control

Joshua Shepherd

Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference toward Truth

Andreas Stokke and Don Fallis

The Epistemology and Auto-Epistemology of Temporal Self-Location and Forgetfulness

Wolfgang Spohn

Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory

Jack Woods and Barry Maguire

Moral Worth and Moral Hobbies

Jennifer Ryan Lockhart

Shifty Contextualism About Epistemics

Caleb Perl

Utterance Understanding, Knowledge and Belief

Lars Dänzer