Ergo is an open access philosophy journal accepting submissions on all philosophical topics and from all philosophical traditions. This includes, among other things: history of philosophy, work in both the analytic and continental traditions, as well as formal and empirically informed philosophy. Ergo is strongly committed to diversity and especially welcomes submissions from members of groups currently underrepresented in philosophy.
Submission and publication are free, and authors retain copyright under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 license. Generous support from the undergraduate departments of philosophy at the University of Toronto's St. George and Mississauga campuses and the University of Toronto's graduate department of philosophy make this arrangement possible.
Papers are published as they are accepted; there is no regular publication schedule.
Many logicians now think that in order to give a uniform solution to the paradoxes of self-reference one must revise logic by dropping one of the usual structural rules. To date almost all such approaches have focused on dropping structural transitivity or structural contraction, and have largely overlooked or ignored the prospects for resolving the paradoxes by dropping structural reflexivity. Here we argue that we have paradox-independent grounds to be dubious of structural reflexivity, and present a way of resolving the paradoxes of self-reference by dropping structural reflexivity altogether, the resulting approach allowing us to recapture classical reasoning as being enthymematic in a particular way.
Nicholas K. Jones
This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. The paper then addresses a prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright.
This paper shows that, in order to understand Hume’s sentimentalism and its meta-ethical implications properly, we must turn to his account of the correction of the sentiments required for moral judgment. I begin by discussing an interpretive question that has not yet received the attention it deserves: how should we understand the standard of impartiality to which his account of correction appeals? Once this question receives an answer, we come to see that Hume endorsed not only causal sentimentalism, the view that typical moral judgments are formed in response to moral sentiments, but also constitutive and epistemic brands of sentimentalism: moral sentiments constitute moral correctness and they can serve as an restricted guide to correct moral judgments. As I will argue, the resulting sentimentalist view entails a form of moral relativism.
Contemporary philosophers nearly unanimously endorse knowledge reliabilism, the view that knowledge must be reliably produced. Leading reliabilists have suggested that reliabilism draws support from patterns in ordinary judgments and intuitions about knowledge, luck, reliability, and counterfactuals. That is, they have suggested a proto-reliabilist hypothesis about “commonsense” or “folk” epistemology. This paper reports nine experimental studies (N = 1262) that test the proto-reliabilist hypothesis by testing four of its principal implications. The main findings are that (a) commonsense fully embraces the possibility of unreliable knowledge, (b) knowledge judgments are surprisingly insensitive to information about reliability, (c) “anti-luck” intuitions about knowledge have nothing to do with reliability specifically, and (d) reliabilists have mischaracterized the intuitive counterfactual properties of knowledge and their relation to reliability. When combined with the weakness of existing arguments for reliabilism and the recent emergence of well-supported alternative views that predict the widespread existence of unreliable knowledge, the present findings are the final exhibit in a conclusive case for abandoning reliabilism in epistemology. I introduce an alternative theory of knowledge, abilism, which outperforms reliabilism and well explains all the available evidence.